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Abstract. We consider abstract-argumentation-theoretic coalition
formability in this work. Taking a model in political alliance among
political parties, we will contemplate profitability, and then forma-
bility, of a coalition. As is commonly understood, a group forms a
coalition with another group for a greater good, the goodness mea-
sured against some criteria. As is also commonly understood, how-
ever, a coalition may deliver benefits to a group X at the sacrifice of
something that X was able to do before coalition formation, which
X may be no longer able to do under the coalition. Use of the typ-
ical conflict-free sets of arguments is not very fitting for this aspect
of coalition, which prompts us to turn to a weaker notion, conflict-
eliminability, as a property that a set of arguments should primar-
ily satisfy. We require numerical quantification of attack strengths
as well as of argument strengths for its characterisation. We will
first analyse semantics of profitability of a given conflict-eliminable
set forming a coalition with another conflict-eliminable set, and will
then provide four coalition formability semantics, each of which for-
malises certain utility postulate(s) taking the coalition profitability
into account.
1 Introduction
Coalition formation among agents is an important topic in many do-
mains including economics, political science, and computer science.
Two groups of agents, by teaming up together, could achieve a task
which they cannot otherwise do on their own. Exploring abstract ar-
gumentation theory for finding an apt characterisation of coalition
formability looks specially rewarding since it is reasonable that we
regard a coalition as a set of arguments its members express. There
are already a few papers in the literature looking at this subject mat-
ter: with preference-based argumentation frameworks and task allo-
cations [1]; with a cooperative goal generation and fulfilling [11],
respecting the property of reciprocity, i.e. agents give to the coali-
tion they are in and benefit from it; and with dialogue games and
pay-offs [30]. Shared by them is the theme of identifying a group of
individual agents who optimise benefits (or social welfare) to them-
selves by being in the group. The optimal group thus formed is free
of internal conflicts, and the participating agents do not have to give
up anything by being a part. We consider this kind of a coalition sup-
portive.
The sort of coalition formation we have in mind, on the other hand,
is one that may be found in political alliance among political parties.
Such alliance is motivated if, for example, political parties want to
reach the voting threshold of passing certain bills or want to win
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national elections. A political-alliance-like coalition exhibits the fol-
lowing unique characteristics:
More organisational than individual It is not possible to freely
move agents across multiple political parties such as to connect
those having close interests together for optimal political party for-
mation. A participant to a political party is often expected to stay
in the party during the parliament term. The assumption of self-
interested agents as studied in [30] does not fit very well here. There
are repercussions to profitability of a coalition, too, in that it is pri-
marily for a party’s, or parties’, benefits than the participants’ ben-
efits that a political alliance is formed.
Partial internal conflicts Agents in a political party should support
the party’s agendas and policies. Hence they do not defeat each
other about them, broadly spoken. It is common, however, that there
are smaller factions within a political party arguing against one
another over details. As a consequence, some participating agents
may be unable to proclaim their opinions on certain policies as the
party’s opinions. Put another way, some individual opinions may
be suppressed for the party.
Asymmetry in attacks to and from a coalition For a political al-
liance to retain any credibility of the arguments it expresses, it must
argue only by the conflict-free, i.e. self-contradiction-free, portion
of the arguments of the party’s participants. But the other political
parties not in the alliance are unhindered by the personal circum-
stance of the alliance. If a political party A is in alliance with an-
other political party B, then an external party C can argue against
any argument of the individual participants in A or in B in order to
criticise not just the individuals but the coalition.
Better larger than smaller In [1], the rate of defections is associ-
ated to the number of agents in a coalition, thus a smaller set pre-
ferred. That does not carry over here: if one single political party
or one single political alliance dominates the parliament, it has to-
tal freedom in policy making, which is clearly desirable. While
not primarily on abstract argumentation, there is a work [12] on
alternating-temporal logic incorporating the framework of [1]. In
the logic, a larger set is better.
Example 1 The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) is tradi-
tionally the most influential but also a complex party of multiple
factions. Its goals are: rapid, export-based economic growth; close
cooperation with the U.S. in foreign and defence policies; simpli-
fication and streaming of government bureaucracy; privatization of
state-owned enterprises; and adoption of measures such as tax reform
for the ageing society. There are three major factions in the LDP:
Heisei Kenkyukai(A)’s promises include international cooperation
with China and Korea, construction of highways, a Gasoline tax,
and protection of small farmers and discriminated peoples.
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Kouchi Kai(B) promises international cooperation with China and
Korea, a government bond and consumption tax for national med-
ical care and national banks which financially support small firms,
and free trade policy.
Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyukai(C) promises tax reduction for high in-
come taxpayers and large companies, a strong military relation-
ship with the U.S. for national defence issues, visits to Yasukuni
Shrine, reduction of road and railway construction, free trade for
car exports, lesser medical care and removal of protection of small
farmers.
Infighting is evident. The argument of A’s and B’s for a close coop-
eration with China and Korea is dampened by C’s visits to Yasukuni
Shrine, A’s argument for protecting small farmers and construction of
highways is in direct conflict with promises of C’s to remove that pro-
tection and to reduce public construction, and B’s free trade policy is
not wholeheartedly welcomed by C which promises free trade chiefly
for car exports. With all these discordance, they are still united in the
LDP because the number matters in politics: losing out in national
elections and in bill-passing as the result of forming an independent
- and less dominant - political party is the greater harm to them. Now,
the LDP as a whole does not (and obviously cannot) express the visit
to Yasukuni Shrine as the LDP’s policy due to the internal conflict.
However, such a circumstance means little to other political parties.
To give evidence, the Japanese Communist Party has long criticised
the Yasukuni Shrine visit by some individual members of the LDP
as a way of criticising the LDP itself. There indeed is asymmetry in
attacks.
In this work, we contemplate abstract-argumentation-theoretic char-
acterisations of profitability, and then formability, of a coalition of
this kind. To be more specific, we consider the following two ques-
tions: (1) suppose a set of arguments that may contain partial internal
conflicts (as an abstract representation of a political party) and sup-
pose also rational criteria of coalition profitability, with which other
(disjoint) sets of arguments that may also contain partial internal con-
flicts (i.e. representations of other political parties) can it profit from
forming a coalition?; and (2) suppose the profitability relation, sup-
pose some rational principles to judge the goodness of a coalition,
and suppose such a set of arguments, with which other (disjoint) such
sets of arguments can it actually form a coalition?
The following are particularly interesting technicalities of these
semantics. First and foremost, the above-described coalition forma-
bility is not simply about whether the resulting coalition is accept-
able, which could be handled by adapting the standard acceptability
semantics in abstract argumentation theory, but about whether a set
of arguments potentially having partial internal conflicts can form
a coalition with another similar set. The former concerns the state
of the resulting set, while the latter must be parametrised by coali-
tion profitabilities of both sets. Secondly, because of the presence
of partial internal conflicts and of the asymmetry in attacks to and
from a coalition, we have to: (1) accommodate a weaker notion than
conflict-freeness as a property that a set of arguments should primar-
ily satisfy - conflict-eliminability as we term it, which permits mem-
bers of a set to attack other members of the same set so long as none
of them is completely defeated; (2) obtain intrinsic arguments of a
conflict-eliminable set, which are the arguments that would remain
if any partial internal conflicts within the set were resolved away3 ;
3 This should not be confused. We are not meaning that some arguments
would disappear as the result. The internal conflicts are assumed non-
defeating. We rather mean that some arguments may be weakened of their
and (3) use the intrinsic arguments to determine which external ar-
guments are being attacked by the conflict-eliminable set, while still
keeping the original arguments of the set in order to determine if it is
being attacked by external arguments (see Asymmetry in attacks to
and from a coalition above). Here again, our task is not just whether
some set of arguments satisfies conflict-eliminability: we must con-
sider if any attacks are strong enough to defeat an argument, and, in
case an argument is attacked but not defeated, how much it would
be weakened/compromised by the attacks. To cope with these, we
attach argument capacity, a numerical value, to each argument, and
an attack strength, again a numerical value, to each attack. The idea
is: a set of arguments is conflict-eliminable just when none of the
members of the set attack an argument of the same set with a greater
numerical value than the argument’s capacity. As the argument ca-
pacities and attack strengths are both numerical, it is easy to derive
its intrinsic arguments and their attacks on external arguments.
1.1 Related work
We are not aware of other works in the literature of abstract argumen-
tation theory dealing with this kind of political-alliance-like coalition
formation, although an earlier draft of this work has been already
cited in [5] for a more specific, logic-oriented instantiation with clas-
sical logic sentences and belief contraction. Also, to the best of our
knowledge, the previous approaches proposed in the abstract argu-
mentation literature are not self-sufficient for dealing with the two
above-mentioned technicalities. We have already mentioned the key
works on coalition formation [1, 11, 30]. They apply Dung’s accept-
ability semantics [18] for characterising acceptability of a coalition
that is individual-benefit-oriented, that is conflict-free, and that gen-
erally prefers a smaller set. In Section 4 of [1] and in [11], a coali-
tion is associated with a set of tasks/goals, and conflicts between
coalitions are measured such as by competition which occurs when
two coalitions share the same tasks/goals. We, however, focus on the
described political-alliance-like coalition profitability/formability se-
mantics with conflict-eliminable sets of arguments. We do not con-
sider the meta-knowledge of tasks or goals. Instead, we measure
profitability of a coalition for a conflict-eliminable set of arguments
by three criteria: (1) the size of the coalition; (2) whether the num-
ber of attackers to the conflict-eliminable set of arguments increases
or decreases in the coalition; and (3) how defended the coalition is
from external arguments. Coalition formability is relativised to prof-
itabilities of two conflict-eliminable sets. A rather different perspec-
tive of coalition formation: calculation of probabilistic likelihood of
a coalition formation capable of achieving some task, given the prior
probability of agents’ joining in a coalition and of preventing other
members from joining in the coalition, was highlighted in probabilis-
tic argumentation frameworks [24]. Such quantitative judgement is
out of the scope of this work.
We mention other works relevant to ours.
Attack-tolerant abstract argumentation Characterisation of ac-
ceptability semantics for a non-conflict-free set of arguments is
gaining attention. The 2-valued semantics [27] makes use of re-
ductio ad absurdum to resolve inconsistency. Conflict-tolerant se-
mantics [4] relaxes conflict-freeness by using four values (accept,
reject, no opinion, and mixed feeling) to label arguments for para-
consistent abstract argumentation. However, these approaches do
potency. See Partial internal conflicts. What would remain are then those
arguments unaffected by the partial internal conflicts and those weakened
arguments.
not incorporate numerical values, which makes it difficult to rea-
son about the strength of attacks. Weighted argument systems [20]
attach numerical values to attack relations. There is also a system-
wide numerical value called the inconsistency budget. In their sys-
tems, conflicts in a set of arguments are quantified as the sum of
numerical values given to the attack relations appearing in the set.
If the sum does not exceed the given inconsistency budget, then the
set is considered para-conflict-free. Their acceptability semantics
is relative to the global inconsistency budget. In our setting, hav-
ing numerical attack strengths alone is not sufficient, as we must
know intrinsic arguments of a conflict-eliminable set, which relies
both on attack strengths and on argument strengths. We do not use
any global and uniform budget. Further, substantively we do not
tolerate any inconsistency: intrinsic arguments must be conflict-
free. Social abstract argumentation frameworks [23], to which an
equational approach [21] also relates, attach numerical values to
arguments in the form of for votes and against votes. They allow
for fine-grained para-consistency. We could potentially adapt their
approach to characterise our conflict-eliminability. However, their
numerical attack characterisations by votes are quite specific. We
choose more abstract, axiomatic characterisations. In the literature,
axiomatic approaches have been considered to, for instance, ensure
logical consistency of an argumentation framework [2,3,13]. Clas-
sifications of attack relations by axioms they satisfy have been also
done [22]. The axiomatic approaches help regulate an abstract ar-
gumentation system from a general standpoint.
Dynamic abstract argumentation Our framework possesses a cer-
tain kind of dynamic nature. So far dynamic changes have been
considered within the literature of abstract argumentation to: as-
sume structural argumentation [8, 14, 19, 28, 29] and modify non-
falsifiable facts [31]; add a new argument [6, 15, 26]; revise attack
relations [17]; revise an argumentation framework by encoding it
into propositional logic [16]; and revise an argumentation frame-
work with an argumentation framework, see [7].4 Given an argu-
mentation framework, these works calculate a revised argumenta-
tion framework. That is, they derive a post-state from a pre-state
given some input. We, however, require interactions between the
initial set of arguments (the pre-state) and intrinsic arguments of
a conflict-eliminable set (post-states) due to the asymmetry in at-
tacks to and from a coalition. The pre-state/post-state coordinations
are, as far as we are able to fathom, not dealt with in the above-
mentioned studies. Meanwhile, one of the works on coalition for-
mation as mentioned earlier, namely [11], admits coalitional and
non-coalitional views of agents. From a non-coalitional view of
agents, a number of coalitional views may be derived. Still, what
they consider are conflicts among coalitional views (for goal ful-
fillment), which is a problem possessing a different nature.
In the rest, we will: recall Nielsen-Parsons’ argumentation frame-
works [25] that generalise Dung’s ones with group attacks (Section
2); introduce our argumentation frameworks for conflict-eliminable
sets of arguments and find a link to Nielsen-Parsons’ frameworks as a
side contribution (Section 3); and develop semantics for profitability,
and then formability, of coalition formation, at the same time pre-
senting theoretical results (Section 4), before drawing conclusions.
4 There are also analysis on mutability of acceptable arguments by adding or
removing an argument and/or an attack [9, 10].
2 Preliminaries
While Dung’s argumentation frameworks [18] are the most important
in the abstract argumentation literature, Nielsen-Parsons’ generalised
versions with group attacks are probably closer to our own. Let us re-
call the key definitions of their frameworks.
An argument is an abstract entity, and the class of all arguments is
A. An argumentation framework is a tuple (A,G) where A ⊆fin A
and G : (2A\∅) × A. A set A1 ⊆ A is said to attack an argu-
ment a ∈ A if and only if, or simply iff, (A′, a) ∈ G for some
A′ ⊆ A1. We say that (A′, a) ∈ G is minimal iff for everyA′′ ⊂ A′,
(A′′, a) 6∈ G. A set A1 ⊆ A is conflict-free iff there exists no
a ∈ A1 such that A1 attacks a. A set A1 ⊆ A defends a ∈ A
iff if (Ax, a) ∈ G for Ax ⊆ A is minimal, then A1 attacks some
ax ∈ Ax. A set A1 ⊆ A accepts a ∈ A iff A1 defends a. A set
A1 ⊆ A is admissible iff A1 accepts all its members. A set A1 ⊆ A
is a preferred set (extension) iff A1 is admissible and there exists no
A1 ⊂ A2 ⊆ A such that A2 is admissible. There are other notions
such as complete sets (extensions), stable sets (extensions), and the
grounded set (extension). An interested reader will find more infor-
mation in [18, 25].
3 Argumentation Frameworks for
Conflict-Eliminable Sets of Arguments
LetN be the class of natural numbers including 0, and let S beA×N.
We refer to any element of S by s with or without a subscript. In our
development, members of S (not of A) are arguments. Not just any
set of arguments will we be interested in, however.
Definition 1 (Coherent sets of arguments) Let S1 be a subset of
S. We say that S1 is coherent iff S1 satisfies the following condi-
tions.
1. S1 is a finite subset of S.
2. For any (a, n) ∈ S1, it holds that n > 0.
3. For any (a, n) ∈ S1, there is no m 6= n such that (a,m) ∈ S1.
An argumentation framework usually satisfies the first condition. To
explain the second condition, we mention that each argument has
argument capacity. For (a, n) ∈ S, a is its identifier, and n is its
capacity. The greater the capacity of an argument is, the more in-
formation it contains. That an argument has argument capacity of 0
basically means that it has no utility. The third property is to ensure
that each argument identity is used by at most one argument in a cho-
sen subset of S. From here on, by S with or without a subscript we
denote a coherent set of arguments.
Example 2 Consider four arguments:
1. a1: I support cooperation with China and Korea. I support con-
struction of highways. I support protection of small farmers. I sup-
port a Gasoline tax.
2. a2: I support cooperation with China and Korea. I support free
trade. I support consumption tax for national medical care and
national banks.
3. a3: I support visits to Yasukuni Shrine. I am against construction
of highways. I support a close military relationship with the U.S. I
support free trade, but only for car exports. I am against protection
of small farmers.
4. a4: I denounce visits to Yasukuni Shrine.
We could (though do not have to) treat the number of sub-arguments
of each argument as its argument capacity so that we have (a1, 4),
(a2, 3), (a3, 5), (a4, 1).
Now, letR be a partial function 2S×S ⇀ N that satisfies the follow-
ing conditions (or axioms). Informally, R(S, s) represents the attack
strength of S’s attack on s. In the below, ‘R is defined for (S, s)’ is
synonymous to ‘R(S, s) is defined’.
1. R is undefined for (∅, s) for any s ∈ S [Coherence].
2. For any S1 ⊆ S ⊆fin S and for any s ∈ S, if R is defined for
(S1, s), then R is defined for any (S2, s) for ∅ ⊂ S2 ⊆ S1.
[Quasi-closure by subset relation].
3. For any S1, S2 ⊆ S ⊆fin S and for any s ∈ S, ifR is defined both
for (S1, s) and for (S2, s), then R is defined also for (S1 ∪ S2, s)
[Closure by set union]
4. For any S1 ⊆ S ⊆fin S and for any s ∈ S such that R is defined
for (S1, s), it holds that R(S1, s) > 0 [Attack with a positive
strength].
5. For any (a, n), (a,m) ∈ S such that n ≤ m, the following holds
true: ifR(S1, s) for some s ∈ S and for some S1 ⊆fin S such that
(a, n) ∈ S1 is defined, then R(S2, s) for S2 = (S1\(a, n)) ∪
(a,m) is defined and is such that R(S1, s) ≤ R(S2, s) [Attack
monotonicity 1 (source)].
6. For any S1, S2 ⊆ S ⊆fin S and for any s ∈ S, if R is defined for
(S1, s), (S2, s) and (S1 ∩ S2, s), then R(S1 ∩ S2, s) ≤ R(Si, s)
for both i = 1 and i = 2 [Attack monotonicity 2 (source)].
7. For any (a, n), (a,m) ∈ S such that n ≤ m, it holds that
if R is defined for (S1, (a, n)) for some S1 ⊆fin S such that
S1 ∩ ⋃l∈N{(a, l)} = ∅, then it is defined for (S1, (a,m)), and,
moreover,R(S1, (a, n)) ≤ R(S1, (a,m)) [Attack monotonicity
3 (target)]
8. For any S1 ⊆fin S and for any s ∈ S, R is undefined for (S1, s)
if s ∈ S1. [No self attacks].
[Coherence] ensures that an attack must come from some argu-
ment(s). [Quasi-closure by subset relation] ensures that there is
a group attack from a set of arguments on an argument just be-
cause each member of the set is attacking the argument. This can be
contrasted with the group attacks in Nielsen-Parsons’ argumentation
frameworks. But it must be noted, as we are to mention shortly, that
that there is an attack of an argument (a1, n1) on another argument
(a2, n2) does not mean that (a1, n1) defeats (a2, n2) in our frame-
work. [Closure by set union] is the reverse of [Quasi-closure by
subset relation]. The purpose of [Attack with a positive strength]
is as follows: we mentioned earlier that R(S1, s) is the strength of
attack by S1 on s, measured in N. The value being positive signals
S1’s attack on s. The value being 0 would mean that S1 is not attack-
ing s. The purpose of an attack relation in abstract argumentation
frameworks is to know which arguments attack which arguments. It
is for this reason that we only consider positive values forR. [Attack
monotonicity 1] expresses the following reasonable property: an at-
tack may be occurring from some S1 ⊆ S ⊆fin S on some s ∈ S;
now, increase the attack capacity of just one argument s1 ∈ S1, keep-
ing all else equal; then the attack which occurred before the capacity
increase should still occur. [Attack monotonicity 2] expresses the
property that if an attack occurs from a set of arguments on an ar-
gument with some strength, then any superset does not decrease the
attack strength. To explain [Attack monotonicity 3], let us say that
a set of arguments is attacking an argument with certain argument
capacity. This intuitively means that the set intends to suppress the
argument. Now, if the argument capacity of the argument increases,
the set still intends to suppress the argument just as strongly or even
more strongly, but not less strongly, for there are more materials in
the argument that the set could attack. This is the direct reading of
the condition. In the technical development to follow, the converse
reading will be more useful: if the argument capacity of the argu-
ment on the other hand decreases, the set may no longer intend to
suppress it further (because an argument with no content ceases to
be any argument in an ordinary sense). Finally, [No self attacks]
prevents self-contradictory arguments from being present.
Additivity of attack strengths is not postulated for R: if an argu-
ment s1 is attacked by s2 and s3 such that R({s2}, s1) = n1 and
that R({s3}, s1) = n2, it is not necessary that R({s2, s3}, s1) =
n1+n2. The additivity holds good when each attack can be assumed
independent, but may not in other cases. A generalised version of
[Attack monotonicity 1] holds good. Let pi be a projection function
that takes a natural number and an ordered tuple Γ (not the particular
symbol Γ but any ordered tuple) and that outputs a set member, such
that pi(n,Γ) = {the n-th member of Γ}. It is undefined if n is greater
than the size of the ordered set.
Proposition 1 (Generalised attack monotonicity 1) Let S1 ⊆fin S
and s ∈ S be such thatR(S1, s) is defined. Then if S2 ⊆fin S is such
that: (1)
⋃
sx∈S1 pi(1, sx) =
⋃
sx∈S2 pi(1, sx); and that (2) (a, n) ∈
S1 materially implies (a,m) ∈ S2 for n ≤ m, then R(S2, s) is
defined.
Proof. By induction on the number of arguments s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈
S2 for which pi(1, s1) = pi(2, s2) and pi(2, s1) < pi(2, s2). Here
and everywhere, we may make use of and (having the semantics of
classical logic conjunction), distinguishing ‘and’ in formal contexts
from ‘and’ in natural contexts for greater clarity. The base case is
vacuous. Use [Attack relation monotonicity] for inductive cases.
Our argumentation framework is (S,R) for some coherent set of ar-
guments S and for some R.
3.1 Attacks
We distinguish complete attacks (defeats) from partial attacks (at-
tacks).
Definition 2 (Attacks and defeats) We say that S1 ⊆ S attacks s ∈
S iff there exists S2 ⊆ S1 such that R is defined for (S2, s). We say
that S1 ⊆ S defeats s ∈ S iff S1 attacks s and there exists some
S2 ⊆ S1 such that: (1)R is defined for (S2, s); and (2) ifR is defined
for (Sx, s) for Sx ⊆ S1, then pi(2, s) ≤ R(S2, s).5
Informally, an attack defeats its target when the attack strength sur-
passes the target’s argument capacity.
Definition 3 (Maximum attack strengths) We define V max(S1, s)
to be: 0 if S1 does not attack s; otherwise, R(S2, s) for some S2 ⊆
S1 such that: (1) R is defined for (S2, s); and (2) if R is defined for
(Sx, s) for Sx ⊆ S1, then R(Sx, s) ≤ R(S2, s).
Example 3 Let us build on Example 2. Notice that (a1, 4) disagrees
with (a3, 5) on 3 points. We can model the attacks between them
via R({(a1, 4)}, {(a3, 5)}) = R({(a3, 5)}, (a1, 4)) = 3, mean-
ing that both of the attacks weaken the attacked argument by 3 sub-
arguments.
3.2 Conflict-eliminable sets
Definition 4 (Conflict-eliminable sets of arguments) We say that
S1 ⊆ S is conflict-eliminable iff there exists no s ∈ S1 such that
S1 defeats s.
5 See in the proof of Proposition 1 for what and is.
Conflict-eliminability is a weaker notion of the usual conflict-
freeness which is the property that there exists no s ∈ S1 such that
S1 attacks s. For the rationale behind obtaining this definition and us-
ing it as a primitive entity in our argumentation framework, we point
back to Example 1 where infighting was evident and where the LDP
political policy did not contain any internally conflicting arguments.
Definition 5 (Intrinsic arguments) Let α : 2S ⇀ 2S be such that
it is defined for S1 ⊆ S iff S1 is conflict-eliminable. If α is de-
fined for S1 ⊆ S, then we define that α(S1) = {(pi(1, s), n) | s ∈
S1 and n = pi(2, s)−V max(S1, s)}. We say that α(S1) are intrinsic
arguments of S1.
Intrinsic arguments of {(a1, 4), (a3, 5)} in Example 2 are
{(a1, 1), (a3, 2)}.
Proposition 2 (Well-definedness) For any S1 ⊆ S, if α is defined
for S1, then every member of α(S1) is a member of S: in particular,
there exists no a ∈ A and no n ∈ N such that (a,−n) ∈ α(S1).
Intrinsic arguments of a conflict-eliminable set must be substantively
conflict-free.
Definition 6 (The view of intrinsic arguments) Let DelR(S, Sx)
be {(Sy, s) | s ∈ Sx ⊆ S and Sy ⊆ Sx and R(Sy, s) is defined.},
which is the set of attack relations within Sx. Now, let S1 be a
subset of S. If α is defined for S1, then we say that ((S\S1) ∪
α(S1), R\Del(S, S1)) is the view that S1 has about S, or simply
S1’s view of S. We denote S1’s view of S by ViewR(S, S1).
Proposition 3 Let S1 be a subset of S. If α(S1) is defined, then
α(S1) is conflict-free in ViewR(S, S1).
Example 4
(a2, 3)
(a4, 2)
(a1, 4)
(a3, 5)
(a2, 3)
(a4, 2)
(a1, 1)
(a3, 2)
(a2, 1)
(a4, 2)
(a1, 1)
(a3, 1)
The left drawing shows the arguments and attacks in our running ex-
ample when none of the arguments are in a coalition with others. The
middle and the right drawings show the views that {(a1, 4), (a3, 5)}
and {(a1, 4), (a2, 3), (a3, 5)} have about them.6 Consider the mid-
dle figure. As we described earlier, three subarguments are in con-
flict between (a1, 4) and (a3, 5), and the intrinsic arguments of
{(a1, 4), (a3, 5)} are {(a1, 1), (a3, 2)}. (a1, 1) represents just one
sub-argument (X) for a Gasoline tax. (a3, 2) represents just two sub-
arguments (Y) for military relationship with the U.S. and (Z) for free
trade for car exports. By Definition 6 and the monotonicity condi-
tions of R, there cannot be attacks between (a1, 1) and (a3, 2) in the
middle drawing. There is a conflict between (Z) and a sub-argument
of (a2, 3) on free trade, and so we put attack arrows between them
in the middle drawing. But none of (X), (Y) and (Z) are in conflict
with (a4, 1), which explains why we do not put attack arrows be-
tween them in the middle drawing. Similarly for the right drawing,
intrinsic arguments are as shown in the figure. Note that the subargu-
ment (Z) of (a3, 5) is also not in agreement with one subargument of
6 These are not uniquely determined by the left drawing. We are deriving all
the three drawings from the actual arguments found in Example 2 with the
8 conditions and Definition 6 as constraints.
(a2, 3) in addition to those that are in conflict with subarguments of
(a1, 4). Consequently the intrinsic arguments contain (a3, 1) instead
of (a3, 2). Meanwhile for (a2, 3), in addition to the policy on free
trade, the policy on international relation is also in conflict with that
of (a3, 5). Consequently, the intrinsic arguments contain (a2, 1).
3.3 Coalition attacks, c-admissible sets and
c-preferred sets
A coalition may attack external arguments only by its intrinsic argu-
ments.
Definition 7 (C-attacks and c-defeats) We say that S1 ⊆ S c-
attacks s ∈ S iff α is defined for S1 and there exists some
S2 ⊆ α(S1) such that pi(2,ViewR(S, S1)) is defined for (S2, s).
We say that S1 c-defeats s ∈ S iff S1 c-attacks s and
pi(2,ViewR(S, S1)))(S3, s) ≥ pi(2, s) for some S3 ⊆ α(S1).
An example of c-defeat in our running example is by {(a3, 5)}
on (a4, 1), and an example of c-attack is by {(a1, 4), (a3, 5)} on
(a2, 3). There are no self c-attacks; Cf. Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 The following are equivalent.
1. S1 ⊆ S c-attacks s ∈ S.
2. S1 ⊆ S c-attacks s ∈ pi(1,ViewR(S, S1)).
Also, the following are equivalent.
1. S1 ⊆ S c-defeats s ∈ S.
2. S1 ⊆ S c-defeats s ∈ pi(1,ViewR(S, S1)).
Proof. By definition, pi(2,ViewR(S, S1))(Sx, s) is undefined for
any Sx ⊆ S1 ∪ α(S1) and for any s ∈ S1 ∪ α(S1). Hence if
S1 ⊆ S c-attacks s ∈ S, then s 6∈ S1 and s 6∈ α(S1). Meanwhile,
(S\S1) = (pi(1,ViewR(S, S1))\α(S1)).
We now define the notions of c-admissible and c-preferred sets,
which are analogous to admissible and preferred sets we touched
upon in Section 2, but which are for conflict-eliminable sets. One
part in the definition could appear difficult at first. We italicise the
part, and elaborate it later.
Definition 8 (C-admissible/c-preferred sets)
We say that S1 ⊆ S is c-admissible iff α is defined for S1 and if
S2 ⊆ pi(1,ViewR(S, S1)) attacks s ∈ S1 and if, for any Sx ⊆ S2
such that R(Sx, s) is defined, there exists some S3 ⊆ α(S1) such
that S3 c-defeat some sx ∈ Sx. We say that S1 ⊆ S is c-preferred
iff S1 is c-admissible and there exists no S1 ⊂ Sy ⊆ S such that Sy
is c-admissible.
We explain why in the italicised part in the above definition it is
S2 ⊆ pi(1,ViewR(S, S1)) and not S2 ⊆ S; and why it is s ∈ S1
and not s ∈ α(S1). The notion of c-admissibility is intuitively the
same as that of admissibility in Section 2: subsets of S2 are attack-
ing a conflict-eliminable set S1; and so S1 is not admissible unless
some member of S1 defeat all the attacking subsets of S2. Now, be-
cause we are presuming that S1 is conflict-eliminable and not nec-
essarily conflict-free, S2 ⊆ S would include any partial conflict in
S1 as an attack. However, c-admissibility, which is the admissibil-
ity of a conflict-eliminable set in the view of the set, should not be
defined to defeat it. This explains why S2 ⊆ pi(1,ViewR(S, S1))
where all those purely internal partial conflicts are compiled away.
On the other hand, the reason that it should be s ∈ S1 and not
s ∈ α(S1) is due to the asymmetry in attacks to and from a conflict-
eliminable set. Recall Asymmetry in attacks to and from a coali-
tion in Section 1. As a consequence, {(a1, 4), (a3, 5)} (and also
{(a1, 4), (a2, 3), (a3, 5)}) in Example 4 is not c-admissible because
the coalition {(a1, 4), (a3, 5)} cannot c-attack (a4, 1) while (a4, 1)
attacks (a3, 5).
3.4 Reduction to Nielsen-Parsons’ argumentation
frameworks
Theorem 1 (Restricted (S,R) as Nielsen-Parsons’) Let R↓ be
such that it satisfies all but [Quasi-closure by subset relation] and
[Closure by set union]. Let S be such that for any S1 ⊆ S and
for any s ∈ S, if R↓ is defined for (S2, s) for some S2 ⊆ S1,
then S1 defeats s. Then (S,R↓) is Nielsen-Parsons’ argumentation
framework, and the following all hold good.
1. Any conflict-eliminable set in S is a conflict-free set.
2. If α is defined for S1 ⊆ S, then α(S1) = S1 and
pi(1,ViewR(S, S1)) = S.
3. A c-attack by S1 ⊆ S on s ∈ S is an attack by S1 on s.
4. A c-attack is a c-defeat.
5. A c-admissible set is an admissible set, and a c-preferred set is a
preferred set.
Proof.
1. By definition, ifR↓ is defined for (S1, s), then S1 defeats s. Hence
it is necessary that a conflict-eliminable set be a conflict-free set.
2. By 1., it is vacuous that α(S1) = S1. Del(S, S1) = ∅, and
pi(1,ViewR(S, S1)) = S.
3. By 2., both are trivial.
4. By definition of (S,R↓).
5. By 2., both are trivial.
With these, it is straightforward to see that (S,R↓) is Nielsen-
Parsons’ argumentation framework.
The three monotonicity conditions may be dropped, too. They are
not relevant to Nielsen-Parsons’ frameworks.
4 Coalition profitability and formability Semantics
It is of interest to learn meaningful conflict-eliminable sets of argu-
ments. In this section we show semantic characterisations of coalition
formability out of conflict-eliminable sets. Since coalition formation
presupposes at least two groups of arguments, what we are character-
ising is not whether a set of arguments is admissible and how good
an admissible set over other admissible sets is, but whether a conflict-
eliminable set can form a coalition with another conflict-eliminable
set, and how good a coalition over other coalitions is. We presume
some conflict-eliminable set at front, and will talk of coalition forma-
bility semantics relative to the conflict-eliminable set. We will first
discuss profitability relation of a coalition, will show its theoretical
properties, and will then present four coalition formability seman-
tics, each of which formalises certain utility postulate(s) taking the
profitability into account. We assume the following notations.
Definition 9 (One-directional attacks) Let S1 ⊆ S be such that
α(S1) is defined. We say that S1 is one-directionally attacked iff
there exists Sx ⊆ pi(1,ViewR(S, S1)) such that Sx attacks s ∈ S1
and S1 does not c-attack any sx ∈ Sx.
{(a1, 4), (a2, 3), (a3, 5)} in the running example in the previous sec-
tion is one-directionally attacked (by (a4, 1)).
Definition 10 (States of a conflict-eliminable set) Let : 2S × 2S
be a binary relation such that (S1, S2) ∈, written also S1  S2,
iff α is defined both for S1 and S2 and any of the three conditions
below is satisfied:
1. S2 is c-admissible.
2. S1 is one-directionally attacked.
3. neither S1 nor S2 is c-admissible or one-directionally attacked.
Informally, if Sx ⊆ S is c-admissible, then it is fully defended from
external attacks and is good. If Sx is one-directionally attacked, then
Sx does not have any answer to external attacks, which is bad. Any
conflict-eliminable set that does not belong to either of them is bet-
ter than being one-directionally attacked but is worse than being c-
admissible. Consequently, if S1  S2, then S2 is in a better state or
in at least as good a state as S1.
Definition 11 (Coalition permission) We say that coalition is per-
mitted between S1 ⊆ S and S2 ⊆ S iff S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and α is
defined for S1 ∪ S2.
The following results tell that this definition of coalition permission
is not underspecified.
Lemma 1 (Defeats are unresolvable) Let S1 and s be such that
S1 ⊆ S and s ∈ S1. If S1 defeats s, then for all S2 such that
S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ S it holds that S2 defeats s.
Proof. By [Attack strength monotonicity] of R.
Proposition 5 (Coalition and conflict-eliminability) If coalition is
permitted between S1 and S2, then α is necessarily defined for S1
and S2.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, then by conflict-eliminability of a set,
there must be an argument in Si, i ∈ {1, 2}, such that Si defeats
s ∈ Si. Apply Lemma 1.
We make one notion formally explicit for convenience, and then de-
fine coalition profitability.
Definition 12 (Attackers) Let Attacker : 2S → 2S be such that
Attacker(S1) = {s ∈ S | there exists some s1 ∈ S1 such that s
attacks s1.}. We say that Attacker(S1) is the set of attackers to S1.
Definition 13 (Coalition profitability) Let : 2S×2S be such that
if S1  S2 (or (S1, S2) ∈ ), then three axioms below are all satis-
fied.
1. S1 ⊆ S2 (larger set).7
2. S1  S2 (better state).
3. |{s ∈ Attacker(S1) | S1 does not c-defeat s and s 6∈ S1}| ≥
|{s ∈ Attacker(S1) | S2 does not c-defeat s and s 6∈ S2 }|
(fewer attackers).
We say that S2 is profitable for S1 iff S1  S2. Due to (better state),
S1S2 implies that α is defined both for S1 and S2. By (larger set),
a set that contains more arguments is a better set. By (better state), a
set that is in a better state is a better set. Finally, by (fewer attackers),
a set that is attacked by a smaller number of arguments is a better
set. The S1 in Attacker(S1) on the second line is not a typo: this
criterion is for measuring the profits of coalition formation for S1.
We have {(a1, 4), (a3, 5)}  {(a1, 4), (a2, 3), (a3, 5)} in Example
4.
7 As illustrated in Introduction, our coalition scenario has this property.
Proposition 6 A (S,R) can be chosen in such a way that a pair of
S1 ⊆ S and S2 ⊆ S do not satisfy more than one axioms of .
Proof. (larger set)
(a1, 2) (a2, 2)
s3
(a1, 1) (a2, 1)
s3
Let S be {(a1, 2), (a2, 2), s3}, and let R be such that it
is defined only for any combination that matches the at-
tack arrows in the two drawings above. Let us define that
R({(a1, 2)}, (a2, 2)) = R({(a2, 2)}, (a1, 2)) =
R({s3}, (a1, 2)) = R({s3}, (a1, 1)) =
R({(a2, 2), s3}, (a1, 2)) = 1, and that R({(a1, 2)}, s3) ≥
pi(2, s3) (among others implicit by the conditions of R). Then
the left and the right drawings represent (S,R) and respectively
ViewR(S, {(a1, 2), (a2, 2)}). Now, let S1 be {(a1, 2)} and let
S2 be {(a1, 2), (a2, 2)}. Then clearly S1 ⊆ S2. However, it
does not satisfy (better state): S1 is neither c-admissible nor
one-directionally attacked but S2 is one-directionally attacked. It
does not satisfy (fewer attackers), either: Attacker(S1) = {s3},
S1 c-defeats s3, and S2 c-defeats none.
(better state)
s1 s2 s3
Let S be {s1, s2, s3}, and letR be such that it is defined only mu-
tually for s1 and s2 as shown above, and such that R({s1}, s2) ≥
pi(2, s2) and R({s2}, s1) ≥ pi(2, s1). Now, let S1 be {s1} and
let S2 be {s3}. Then S1  S2 because S2 is c-admissible. How-
ever, clearly it is not the case that S1 ⊆ S2. Also, Attacker(S1) =
{s2}, S1 c-defeats s2, but S2 does not c-defeat it.
(fewer attackers) Let S be {s1, s2, s3}, and let R be such that it
is defined as is previously, and such that R({s1}, s2) < pi(2, s2)
and R({s2}, s1) < pi(2, s1). Now, let S1 be {s3}, and let S2 be
{s2}. ThenAttacker(S1) = ∅, and so (fewer attackers) is satisfied
trivially. However, clearly it is not the case that S1 ⊆ S2. And it
is not the case that S1  S2, because S1 is c-admissible, while S2
is neither c-admissible nor one-directionally attacked.
4.1 Theoretical results around profitability
It is easy to see that there exists some (S,R) and some S1, S2 ⊆ S
such that S1  S1 ∪ S2. We state other results.
Theorem 2 Let S1 ⊆ S be such that α(S1) is defined, and let Sx ⊆
S be a c-admissible set. If S1 ⊂ Sx, then the following all hold good.
1. α is defined for S2 = Sx\S1.
2. Coalition is permitted between S1 and S2.
3. S1  Sx.
Proof.
1. Suppose otherwise, then S2 would defeat at least one s ∈ S2 if S2
defeats s. By lemma 1, Sx would then defeat s, for S2 ⊆ Sx. But
Sx, being c-admissible, does not defeat s.
2. α is defined for Sx by definition; and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, also by defi-
nition.
3. S1 ⊆ Sx, Sx is a c-admissible set, and
|{s ∈ Attacker(S1) | Sx does not c-defeat s and s 6∈ Sx}| = 0.
Theorem 3 (Existence theorem) If, for any S1 ⊆ S, there exists
some S2 ⊆ S such that coalition is permitted between S1 and S2
and S1  S1 ∪ S2 and S1 ∪ S2 is c-admissible, then there exists
some S3 ⊆ S such that coalition is permitted between S1 and S3
and S1  S1 ∪ S3 and S1 ∪ S3 is c-preferred and S2 ⊆ S3.
Proof. As S is of a finite size, it is straightforward to see that if
S1 ∪ S2 is c-admissible, then there must exist some c-preferred set
Sx such that S1 ∪ S2 ⊆ Sx. We show that the choice of Sx\S1 for
S3 ensures the requirement to be fulfilled. By Theorem 2 coalition
is permitted between S1 and S3 and S1  S1 ∪ S3. By assumption,
S1 ∪ S3 = Sx is c-preferred and S2 ⊆ S3.
Theorem 4 (Mutually maximal coalition) Let S1 ⊆ S be such
that α(S1) is defined, and let Pref(S1) be the set of all c-preferred
sets that contain S1 as their subset. If Pref(S1) 6= ∅, then the follow-
ing holds good: for any Sx ∈ Pref(S1), S1Sx and (Sx\S1)Sx
and there exists no Sx ⊂ Sy ⊆ S such that S1  Sy or such that
(Sx\S1) Sy .
Proof. By Theorem 2 and by the definition of a set being c-
preferable.
In general, though, the mutual profitability is not a guaranteed prop-
erty.
Theorem 5 (Asymmetry of profitabilities) There exists an argu-
mentation framework (S,R) with disjoint subsets: S1 and S2, of S
satisfying S1  S1 ∪ S2 but not satisfying S2  S1 ∪ S2.
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Proof. Let S be {s1, (a2, 2), s3, s4, s5}, and let R be defined only
for any combination that matches the attack arrows in the drawings
above, satisfying: R({s1}, (a2, 2)) = 1;
R({s1, (a2, 1)}, s3) ≥ pi(2, s3); R({s1}, s3) < pi(2, s3);
R({(a2, 2)}, s3) < pi(2, s3); R({(a2, 1)}, s4) < pi(2, s4);
R({(a2, 1)}, s5) < pi(2, s5); R({(a2, 2)}, s4) ≥ pi(2, s4);
R({(a2, 2)}, s5) ≥ pi(2, s5); R({s3}, s1) ≥ 2;
R({s4}, (a2, 1)) ≥ 2; and R({s5}, (a2, 1)) ≥ 2, among others.
Now, let S1 be {s1}, and let S2 be {(a2, 2)}. Then S1S1 ∪S2,
for S1 and S1∪S2 are both neither c-admissible nor one-directionally
attacked. The axiom (fewer attackers) is also satisfied. However, it is
not the case that S2S1∪S2, for it does not satisfy (fewer attackers).
Moreover,  does not satisfy what we may at first expect to hold
good, i.e. the following continuation property.
Definition 14 (Continuation property of ) Let S1 ⊆ S be such
that α(S1) is defined, and let Max(S1) be the set of all Sx ⊆ S
such that S1  Sx and such that if Sx ⊂ Sy ⊆ S, then not S1 
Sy . We say that  is weakly continuous for S1 iff there exists some
Sz ∈ Max(S1) such that, for any Sw ⊆ Sz , if coalition is permitted
between S1 and Sw\S1, then S1  Sw. We say that  is continuous
for S1 iff it is weakly continuous for S1 for any Sz ∈ Max(S1).
Theorem 6 (Profitability discontinuation theorem) There exist
S1, S2, Sx ⊆ S such that: (1) α is defined for S1, S2 and Sx; (2)
Sx ∈ Max(S1); and (3) S2 ⊆ Sx, but such that S1  S2 does not
hold good. Moreover, Max(S1) = Pref(S1) would not change this
result.
Proof. It suffices to consider the case where Max(S1) = Pref(S1).
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Let S be {(a1, 2), (a2, 2), s3, s4, s5}, and let R be such that it is
defined only for any combination that matches the attack ar-
rows in the drawings above, and: R({(a1, 2)}, s4) ≥ pi(2, s4);
R({(a2, 2)}, s5) ≥ pi(2, s5); R({(a1, 2)}, (a2, 2)) = 1;
R({(a2, 2)}, (a1, 2)) = 1; R({s3}, s4) ≥ pi(2, s4);
R({(a2, 1), s3}, s5) ≥ pi(2, s5); R({s4}, (a1, 1)) ≥ 2;
and R({s5}, (a2, 1)) ≥ 2, among others. Clearly α is defined
for S1 = {(a1, 2)}, Sa = {(a2, 2)} S2 = S1 ∪ Sa, and
Sx = {(a1, 2), (a2, 2), s3}, among others. Further, Sx is c-
preferrable. However, it is not the case that S1S2. In fact, it is also
not the case that Sa S2, since S2 is one-directionally attacked (see
the right drawing for the attacks in ViewR(S, {(a1, 2), (a2, 2)})),
whereas S1 and Sa are neither c-admissible nor one-directionally
attacked (see the left drawing).
Coalition profitability continuation property holds good in certain
special cases, however.
Theorem 7 (Profitability continuation theorem) Let Sx ⊆ S be a
c-preferred set. Then is weakly continuous for any S1 ⊂ Sx iff any
disjoint pair Sy, Sz of subsets of Sx satisfy Sy  Sy ∪ Sz .
Proof. If: Suppose, by way of showing contradiction, there are
three disjoint subsets of Sx: Sa, Sb and Sc, such that Sa 
Sa ∪ Sb 6 (Sa ∪ Sb) ∪ Sc. By assumption we have (Sa ∪ Sb)
(Sa ∪ Sb) ∪ Sc, contradiction.
Only if: By definition of weak continuation property of .
4.2 Coalition formability semantics
We use the profitability relation to express our coalition formability
semantics. We set forth three rational utility postulates:
I Coalition is good when it is profitable at least to one party.
II Coalition is good when it is profitable to both parties.
III Coalition is good when maximal potential future profits are ex-
pected from it.
Of these, the first two can be understood immediately with the prof-
itability relation. Say there are two sets S1 and S2 between which
coalition is permitted. For I, at least either S1S1∪S2 or S2S1∪S2
must hold good. In comparison, both of them must hold good for
II. Our interpretation of the last postulate is as follows. Suppose a
party, some conflict-eliminable set S1 ⊆ S in our context, considers
coalition formation with another conflict-eliminable set S2. We know
that S2 is some subset of S1 ⊆ S\S1. Before S1 forms a coalition
with S2, we have Max(S1) as the set of maximal coalitions possi-
ble for S1. Once the coalition is formed, we have Max(S1 ∪ S2) as
the set of maximal coalitions possible for the coalition. Here clearly
Max(S1 ∪ S2) ⊆ Max(S1). What this means is that a particular
choice of S2 blocks any possibilities in Max(S1)\Max(S1 ∪ S2):
they become unrealisable from S1 ∪ S2. Hence S1 has an incentive
not to form a coalition with a S2 if all the members of Max(S1∪S2)
are strictly and comparatively less profitable than some member of
Max(S1). We reflect this intuition.
Definition 15 (Maximal profitability relation)
Let ≤l,≤b,≤f : 2S × 2S be such that they satisfy all the following:
1. S1 ≤l S2 iff |S1| ≤ |S2|.
2. S1 ≤b S2 iff S2 is at least as good by (better state) as S1.
3. S1 ≤f S2 iff S2 is at least as good by (fewer attackers) as S1.
We write S1 <β S2 for each β ∈ {l, b, f} just when S1 ≤β S2
and not S2 ≤β S1. Then we define m : 2S × 2S to be such that if
S1 m S2, then both of the following conditions satisfy:
1. S1  S2.
2. Some Sx ∈ Max(S2) is such that, for all Sy ∈ Max(S1),
if Sx <β Sy for some β ∈ {l, b, f}, then there exists γ ∈
({l, b, f}\β) such that Sy <γ Sx.
Intuitively, if S1m S2, then at least one set in Max(S1) maximal in
the three criteria: the set size, the state quality and the number of ex-
ternal attackers, is reachable from S2. The maximality here is judged
by the principle that if S2, S3 ∈ Max(S1) are equal by two criteria,
then S3 is better if it is better than S2 by the remaining criterion.
We define four formability semantics: W which respects I, M
which respects II (and implicitly also I), WS which respects I and
III, and S which respects II and III.
Definition 16 (Coalition formability semantics)
W(S1) = {S2 ⊆ S | S1  S1 ∪ S2 or S2  S1 ∪ S2}.
M(S1) = {S2 ⊆ S | S1  S1 ∪ S2 and S2  S1 ∪ S2}.
WS(S1) = {S2 ⊆ S | S1 m S1 ∪ S2 or S2 m S1 ∪ S2}.
S(S1) = {S2 ⊆ S | S1 m S1 ∪ S2 and S2 m S1 ∪ S2}.
Here, or has the semantics of classical logic disjunction. Intuitively,
ρ(S1) for ρ ∈ {W,M,WS,S} means that S1 is comfortable with
forming a coalition with S2 ∈ ρ(S1) under the given criteria.
Theorem 8 Let S1 ⊆ S be such that α(S1) is defined. The follow-
ing all hold good. (1) M(S1) ⊆ W(S1). (2) WS(S1) ⊆ W(S1).
(3) S(S1) ⊆ M(S1). (4) S(S1) ⊆ WS(S1). Meanwhile, neither
WS(S1) ⊆ M(S1) nor M(S1) ⊆ WS(S1) is necessary.
We provide one example to illustrate the semantic differences. Let
S = {s1, (a2, 2), (a3, 2), s4, s5, s6, s7}, and let R be such that it is
defined only for any combination that matches the attack arrows in
the above drawings, and such that:
R({(a2, 2)}, (a3, 2)) = 1; R({(a2, 2)}, s4) ≥ pi(2, s4);
R({(a2, 2)}, s5) ≥ pi(2, s5);R({(a2, 1), s1}, (a3, 2)) ≥ 2;
R({(a2, 1)}, s4) < pi(2, s4); R({(a2, 1)}, s5) < pi(2, s5);
R({s1}, (a3, 2)) = 1; R({(a3, 1)}, s1) ≥ pi(2, s1);
R({(a3, 1)}, s6) ≥ pi(2, s6); R({s6}, (a3, 1)) = 2;
R({s6}, s7) ≥ pi(2, s7); R({s7}, s6) ≥ pi(2, s6);
R({s7}, s5) ≥ pi(2, s5); R({s7}, s4) ≥ pi(2, s4);
R({s4}, s7) < pi(2, s7); R({s4}, (a2, 1)) = 2;
R({s5}, (a2, 1)) = 2; R({s5}, s7) < pi(2, s7);
R({s4, s5}, s7) ≥ pi(2, s7), among others that are implicit
by the conditions of R.
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We have:
W({(a2, 2)}) = {{(a3, 2)}, {s1}, {s6}, {s7}, {s1, s6}, {s1, s7},
{(a3, 2), s7}}.
M({(a2, 2)}) = {{(a3, 2)}, {s7}, {s1, s6}, {s1, s7}, {(a3, 2), s7}}.
WS({(a2, 2)}) = {{(a3, 2)}, {s1}, {s7}, {s1, s7}, {(a3, 2), s7}}.
S({(a2, 2)}) = WS({(a2, 2)}).
The above drawings from (b) to (h) correspond to
ViewR(S, {(a2, 2)} ∪ Si) where Si is the ith element in the set on
the right hand side of the first equation. The first two equalities can be
checked one by one. For WS({(a2, 2)}), we note that {s1, s6} (see
(f)) is excluded because: (1) for {(a2, 2)}, {(a2, 2), (a3, 2), s7} and
{s1, (a2, 2), s7} (see (g) and (h)) are both strictly better in m than
{s1, (a2, 2), s6} by (fewer attackers), and {s1, (a2, 2), s6} would
block the better coalitions; and (2) for {s1, s6}, {s1, s6, s4, s5}
is strictly better in m than {s1, (a2, 2), s6}. Similarly {s6} is
excluded. Finally, in this particular example, both {s1, (a2, 2), s7}
and {(a2, 2), (a3, 2), s7} are c-preferred, and, moreover, we have:
{(a3, 2)} m {(a2, 2), (a3, 2), s7}; {s1} m {s1, (a2, 2), s7};
{s7} m {s1, (a2, 2)s7}; and {s7} m {(a2, 2), (a3, 2), s7}.
By these together with the subsumption of S({(a2, 2)}) in
WS({(a2, 2)}) (Theorem 8), the last equality for S({(a2, 2)})
follows.
5 Conclusion
We proposed abstract-argumentation-theoretic coalition profitability
and formability semantics, and showed theoretical results. Our work
has a connection to several important subfields of abstract argumen-
tation theory such as postulate-based abstract argumentation, attack-
tolerant abstract argumentation and dynamic abstract argumentation.
It is our hope that this study will further aid in linking the rich knowl-
edge that is being accumulated in the literature.
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